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the will to the commission of the offence." Therefore, the penal
act in question, "relative to the Pittsburgh and Connellsville Railroad Company," Penn. Acts 1863, No. 914, was a usurpation of
power properly belonging to the judiciary, and was unconstitutional and inoperative. Its recitals of alleged facts of misuse
and abuse concluded nobody, and were wholly ineffectual. If
this be true, so much of the 1st section of that act as undertook
tb provide for the appraisement and valuation of the expenditures
of this company upon its lines of railroad southwardly and eastwardly of Connellsville was without any effect whatever; and the
provision in the same section, vesting in the purchaser of such
appraised work the right to use it, was equally nugatory.
It follows that the Act of 1864, No. 914, incorporating the
Connellsville and Southern Pennsylvania Railroad Company, is
wholly inoperative, in so far as it grants to that company any of
the existing rights and franchises of the Pittsburgh and Connellsville Railroad Company.
The Pittsburgh and Connellsville Railroad Company had, at the
time of the passage of that act, a vested right to choose a route
for its road ; and the state of Pennsylvania could not take this
away by any legislative act, unless the charter of the company
had been, in whole or in part, forfeited by a proper judicial proceeding: Canal Company v. railroad Company, 4 G. & J. 144,
145, 150; Begents of University of Maryland v. Williams, 9
G. & J. 409, 410, 412.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

Superior Court of Chicago.
GEORGE SHERWOOD ET AL. v. ALFRED H. ANDREWS ET AL.
A trade-mark, which is merely descriptive of the kind of articles or goods to
which it is applied, is not a trade-mark in a legal sense, and is not entitled to protection as such.
A trade-mark, to entitle an assignee to protection in its exclusive use, must
indicate by appropriate words, as "executor," "assignee," or "successor," his
relation to the original proprietor.
The trade-mark of a defunct corporation does not descend to the stockholders
at the time of its dissolution.
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Bill for Injunction.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
WILSON, C. J.-The relief sought in this case is a perpetual
injunction against the defendants, restraining them from using
upon their goods and packages the words "Holbrook" or "Holbrooks," which the complainants claim as their trade-marks. It
appears from the evidence that the articles known as the "Holbrook School Apparatus" were originated substantially in their
present forms by Josiah Holbrook, who commenced their manufacture in the year 1828 at West Boylston, Massachusetts, and
in Boston in 1829. That the articles were not new, but were
simplified in construction and designed to illustrate in common
schools subjects which had been taught in colleges and higher
schools by the use of more expensive apparatus. Between the
years 1829 and 1844 Josiah Holbrook established other manufactories of the apparatus at Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New
York. It does not appear, however, that he had anything to do
with manufacturing after the year 1844, though he lived until
the year 1853. One Murdock, who was employed by Josiah
Holbrook at West Boylston, has been since engaged in the manufacture of the said apparatus at that place from the year 1829
until this time, and has always advertised and sold the articles as
"Holbrook's Apparatus." N. B. Chamberlain, who succeeded
Josiah Holbrook in the Boston manufactory, for several years
manufactured the apparatus under the name of "1Holbrook's Ap.
paratus," and he and his sons have continued until now to manufacture the same articles. During the same period a firm in
Worcester, Mass., manufactured the same articles by the same
names. Some parties, also, in Western New York made the
apparatus by the same name during the same period. Dwight
Holbrook, son of Josiah Holbrook, commenced the manufacture
of the apparatus at Berea, Ohio, in 1844, and continued manufacturing largely at that place until some time in the year 1852.
In 1846 some of Dwight Holbrook's workmen established a manufactory at Olmstead, Ohio, and manufactured the same articles.
Dwight Holbrook, previous to 1852, made more than $100,000
worth of apparatus, and the same became generally known as
11Holbrook's Apparatus," both in the United States and in
Canada. The witness, Rolph, states that the apparatus was as
well known by the name of "1Holbrook's Apparatus," as "Web-
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ster's Spelling Book" was by that name.

In 1852 Dwight Hol-

brook was instrumental in procuring the organization of a stock
company, under the general laws of Connecticut, called the
"Holbrook School Apparatus Company," owning at the time of
its organization two-fifths of its stock. This company immediately
commenced the manufacture of the apparatus, Dwight Holbrook
superintending the business. After June 1859, the company
did not carry on the manufacture but employed Holbrook to
manufacture under contracts made from time to time with the
company, up to January 1st 1865. The complainants, as individuals, oi" as a firm, in March 1865, became the owners of all
the stock in said company and soon after procured a dissolutiQn,
and removed a portion of the tools and machinery to Chicago,
and sold a portion of the tools and machinery to Dwight Holbrook. This sale and removal was made about the .middle of
April last. It also appears that all the individuals named as
having made the apparatus called it " Holbrook's Apparatus,"
and by that name it became extensively known, used, and advertised. Labels containing the word "Holbrook" were used on
some of the articles and on boxes containing the same as early
as April 1831. In 1852, neither Dwight Holbrook nor the
company claimed the word "Holbrook" or "Holbrooks" as a
trade-mark, as testified by Boardman, the first secretary of the
company. It is not a little remarkable that the articles sold by
the defendants previous to May last, and upon which the marks
are placed, are made by Dwight Holbrook, a son of the Holbrook
who first made the articles and used the marks, and that the
same Dwight Holbrook superintended the manufacture, or made
under contract with the company all the articles made by the
"Holbrook School Apparatus Company," from which the complainants claim to have derived their right of the exclusive use
of these words as trade-marks. All the witnesses but one state
that the words " Holbrook" and " Holbrooks" were merely
descriptive of a class of articles used in schools to illustrate
astronomy, geography, and geometry, first introduced to public
notice by Josiah Holbrook, and that the words were not used to
indicate that the articles were manufactured by any particular
person. This statement of the witnesses is doubtless correct for
many years past, and I have as lttle doubt that the other witness
is correct in relation to several years after the first introduction
by Josiah Holbrook, in saying that the words did indicate the
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manufacturer. From the facts stated it could hardly be otherwise, inasmuch as Holbrook first manufactured them and gave
his name to them, and so marked the packages. It does not appear that Josiah Holbrook during his life claimed these words as
trade-marks, but, on the other hand, others, with his knowledge,
manufactured the same articles under these names, and so far as
appears, without objection from him. It is clear that if any one
was entitled to claim these words as trade-marks, it was Josiah
Holbrook. iHe having failed to claim it, or even to assign it, so
far as appears, and the names having been applied as a general
designation of the articles manufactured by different persons in
different places for twenty years before the complainants or the
company used the names: the case upon this point is directly
within the principle decided in the cases of Singleton v. Bolton,
3 Doug. 393 ; Canlham v. Jones, 2 Vesey & Bea. 218 ; Thompson v. Winchester, 19 Pick. 214. In all these cases the articles
were first manufactured by the person who named them, and first
applied the names to the articles respectively as in this case, and
the mark, as in this case, included in some form the surname of
the person who first manufactured the article, thus: "Dr. Johnson's Yellow Ointment;" "1Yelno's Vegetable Syrup ;" "Thompsonian Medicine." Relief was refused in equity, and the plaintiffs failed to recover at law because the names had by use
become generic-merely descriptive of the kind of articles to
which they were applied, without reference to any particular
manufacturer. So, in the present case, the name of" Holbrook"
and "Holbrooks," as applied to school apparatus, had become
generic, and descriptive merely of the class of articles manufactured to elucidate astronomy, geography, and geometry in
schools.
But it is said that during the existence of the company there
is no evidence that any others than the company used these
marks, and that the company had a right to, and did adopt these
marks, and use them, connected with the articles so manufactured
by the company. Assuming this to be true, how are the complainants benefited by the admission ? The admission, in order
to aid the complainants, necessitates the following positions,
which are assumed and insisted on by the complainants :--That
the company not only had, at the time of the dissolution, the
exclusive right to use these marks as trade-marks, but that by
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that dissolution the right vested in the complainants as part of
the good-will of the defunct corporation. This right of heirship
is predicated upon the fact that the complainants, either individually or as partners at the time of the dissolution of the company,
had acquired title to and owned all the stock of the company;
and upon the farther fact that they retained a portion of the tools
formerly used by the company. No case has been cited establishing the doctrine that the good-will of a defunct corporation
descends to the late stockholders, or that the right of the exclusive use of the trade-mark of such corporation survives. But it
is said, by analogy to the doctrine of assignment and descent,
as established by the cases of Croft v. Day, Lewis v. Langdon,
Bddleston v. Vick, the complainants should be protected as
assignees by operation of law. When I consider the general
understanding of the profession in relation to the doctrine
assumed to be established by these cases, I cannot say I am surprised at the position assumed by the counsel in the case, nor am
I prepared to say that the relief sought in this case is not as
much in harmony with the well-established principles governing
the class of cases in relation to the original proprietors of trademarks and the general principles of equity jurisprudence as the
supposed doctrine of the cases cited. The case of Croft v. Day,
7 Beav. 84, decided by Lord .LANGDALE, Master of the Rolls, has
no bearing on .the question of the right of the executor of the
proprietor of a trade-mark to be protected by injunction in its
exclusive use. The Master of the Rolls says expressly, " My
decision does not depend on any peculiar or exclusive right that
the complainants (the executors of Day) have to use the names of
'Day and Martin,' but upon the fact of the defendant using these
names in connection with circumstances, and in a manner calculated to mislead the public, and enable the defendant to obtain,
at the expense of Day's estate, a benefit for himself to which he
is not in fair and honest dealing entitled." The case of Lewis
v. Langdon, 7 Simons 421, instead of favoring the doctrine of
transfer of the right to use a trade-mark, merely decides that the
right to use a partnership-name survives to the survivor or survivors on the death of the partner. A proposition somewhat difficult to maintain upon principle, I apprehend. The injunction in
that case was doubtless properly granted upon the facts stated in
the bill. The complainants were not using the name of Blackman
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& Langdon-the original firm-name-but claimed to be successors
of Blackman & Langdon, which was true. The defendants were
doing business under the name of Blackman and Langdon, both
of whom were dead. This use of the firm-name in the same business was a fraud on the public, and an injury to the complainants, by inducing persons to believe that the firm was still in
existence, and thus obtaining the advantage of their reputation
as manufacturers, and depriving the complainants of the benefits
they might justly derive from being as they were, and claimed
to be, the successors of the firm of Blackman & Langdon.
The case of Eddleston v. Vick, 23 Eng. L." & R. Rep. 51, is
cited as sustaining the position that a purchaser of the machinery
and stock of a bankrupt manufacturer acquires the right to use the
names and labels of the bankrupt on his manufactures. ViceChancellor WOOD, in his opinion, says that "the complainants in
that case are justified in using the name of the old firm." He
places the right to the exclusive use of the engravings upon the
wrappers and interior sheets, in which the pins were enclosed,
upon the fact of the purchase of the plates from the assignees in
bankruptcy, and the use of them by the complainant for eleven
years, but says, "the complainants obtained the right of property
in the use of the engravings by use alone." It is apparent, from
the statement of the facts of the case, that the engravings alone,
without the name of "Taylor & Co.," were not trade-marks in
the legal sense, as they gave no information in relation to the
person who manufactured the pins even when used by the original
firm, and when used by the complainant in connection with
"Taylor & Co.," it gave false information, inasmuch as they were
not manufactured by "Taylor & Co." These cases, and ioyne
v. oyt, 10 London Jur. R. 106, are cited by Mr. Upton, in his
able treatise on the law of trade-marks, to sanction the position
that "protection in the exclusive use of trade-marks may be
acquired by operation of law, as well as by transfer of the right
to manufacture and sell." (Upton on Trade-Marks, page 80.)
This statement of Mr. Upton may be said to embody the general
impression of the profession upon this question.
It is to be regretted that the courts have not in all cases conformed to the principles by which they profess to be governed,
but have, in one case at least, sanctioned and encouraged frauds
and impositions which they assume to prevent. I refer to the
VoL. XIV.-38
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case of -Eddlestonv. Vick (before referred to), and Croft v. Day,
and Lewis v. Langdon, so far as they are assumed to sanction
the doctrine that the legal representatives of deceased persons
and assignees in bankruptcy and by contract are to be protected
in the exclusive use of the trade-marks of those they represent.
It is apparent, from the simple statement of the rule, that it
violates every principle, so far as the public is concerned, upon
which the exclusive use of a trade-mark is based. A man is
entitled to be protected in the exclusive use of a trade-mark,
because it designates the goods which he manufactures and sells,
and because he is justly entitled to all' profits and advantages
accruing by reason of his integrity and skill as a manufacturer
or merchant, and because the use of such a trade-mark by another
deprives him of these profits and advantages, and is a fraud upon
him and an imposition upon the public, being designed and
intended to induce the public to purchase the goods as the goods
originally made or owned by the party first adopting such trade
marks. Upon this ground, the courts enjoin, in behalf of the
party first appropriating the trade-mark, all persons using the
same marks or colorable imitations calculated to deceive the
public: The Collins Company v. Cowen, 3 Kay & Johns. 428;
Morrison v. Salmon, 2 M. & G. 885; Day v. Binning, 1 Coop.
Ch. R. 489; Amoskeag Manufacturing Company v. Speer, 2
Lan. Sup. C. 0. 599; Stokes v. Landgraf, 17 Barb. 608.
But in the case of assignments by the rule adopted in these
cases, as contended by the complainant's counsel, they in fact
sanction and license, in the assignees and purchaser, the very
fraud and imposition which they so strongly reprobate and enjoin
when perpetrated by another person than the purchaser or
assignee ; in other words, the courts will enjoin a party from committing a fraud or holding out false colors to deceive the public
unless he pays for the privilege. In that case, the court protects
him by injunction in the exclusive privilege of deceiving the
public by putting on his goods a mark indicating that the goods
were made or originally owned by a man long since dead, and
whose very name, perchance, would have been forgotten but for
the lying trade-mark used by one who has neither his skill as a
manufacturer nor his honesty as a. man of business, but in both
particulars is the opposite of the original proprietor. "To be a
trade-mark," say the courts, "it must indicate who owned or
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made the article on which it is placed. If this is not done, it is
not entitled to protection as a trade-mark, because the party could
not, in such a case, be injured in his business by the adoption
of the same mark by others."
All who use trade-marks, indicating that the articles were
origina_,y manufactured or owned by others, are practising an
imposition upon the public. Every assignee and purchaser, who
uses the trade-mark of the original proprietor, without indicating
that he is the assignee or purchaser, is in this position ; and thus
an article which, by reason of the skill and integrity of the original proprietor, has justly acquired a reputation which insures the
sale of the article at a large profit, is, by the aid of the cofrts,
permitted to be adulterated and sold, by some dishonest assignee
of the trade-mark, as made by the original owner. Thus the
public, which the courts are so zealous to protect against the
fraud and impositions of one class, are handed over to the tender
mercies of a more dangerous class, with the license and exclusive
*indorsement of a court of equity; and the confiding public pay
an extra price for a mixture of chalk, lime, and lead, labelled
" A. B. Pure White Lead," or for a mixture of Indian meal,
turmeric, and mustard, labelled "C. D. Pure 'Mustard." By what
process the assignees and legal representatives of a manufacturer
or trader are inoculated so as to have the skill and integrity of the
original owners of the trade-mark transferred to them, is not disclosed. As there is no American case, so far as I am advised, which
sanctions this doctrine, even admitting that the English cases cited
decide all that is claimed, they are entitled to and will receive no
more respect than is due to them as exponents of equitable principles. Until it can be shown that skill and integrity can be
transferred bodily from man to man, or descend, like goods and
chattels, to legal representatives, I shall most emphatically repudiate the authority of cases that are not only not in harmony with
equitable principles, but are in direct conflict with those principles
as applied to the same subject by the same courts. In the able
treatise of Mr. Upton on Trade-Marks, before referred to, refer
ence is made to the case of Compeer v. Bajou et al., decided by
the Tribunal of Commerce of Paris, and affirmed on appeal by the
Imperial Court of Appeals, in 1854. A translation is there given
of thfe judgment and decree affirming it. (See Upton on TradeMarks, p. 71.) This case seems to be an authority for the doc-
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trine that an assignee of a trade-mark may use it without using
any words to indicate in what relation or capacity he is using it.
That one man may use the name or trade-mark of another with
his authority and consent, is a proposition no one would dispute;
but that he may use either in such a manner as to import falsehood by which the public may be imposed upon and defrauded, is
another question, and it, I apprehend, will receive a different
answer, at least from American courts.
From the -statement of the case, it appears that, by contract
between Bajou and Morel, the assignor of the complainant, Compeer, Bajou sold the machinery and stock used in carrying on
the business of glove-making, and the good-will of the business in
express terms, and agreed that "Morel, exclusively of all other
persons, might carry on the business, designating himself as suc.
cessor to Bajou, and stamp his gloves with Bajou's manufacturer's
mark, a fa-simile of his signature." Whether Morel and Com.
peer-used the trade-mark of Bajou in connection with other words
importing they were successors of Bajou, according to the contract, does not appear. The fair inference, perhaps, from the
judgment and decree, is that they did not. If they merely put
on the name of Bajou, it was simply an imposition on the public,
deliberately practised by Compeer, and, it would seem, specially
for the benefit of his American customers.
The judgment recites that " from information the tribunal had
collected, Bajou's name as a mark was an indispensable auxiliary
for insuring the sale, especially in America;" that is, as the
Americans bought gloves with Bajou's stamp on -them, at high
prices on account of the reputation he had acquired for skill and
integrity in their manufacture, and as the gloves could not be
sold if the real manufacturer put on a stamp indicating the fact,
theiefore the court sanctions the imposition. This may be commercial morality in France, but can hardly commend itself as
authority in American courts.
How this decision can be reconciled with the principle of the
provision of the Commercial Code of France, which provides that
" the names of the associates can alone constitute a firm name,"
is not for this court, but for the Tribunal of Commerce, and those
maintaining the correctness of this decision, to do. I am unable
to discover any distinction in morals between the act of a party
who uses a firm name which is calculated to give a false impres-
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sion to the public, and the act of a party who does the same thing
by a trade-mark. It is no hardship to require an executor, who
carries on the business of the testator, to indicate the fact in his
trade-mark, and so of assignee in bankruptcy or otherwise. Nor
can I understand upon what principle the legal representative or
avsignee of a party is any more entitled to the aid of a court in
practising imposition on the public, than the man who is an
original genius, and resorts to that mode of doing business from
a natural impulse. Certainly a court that insists upon honesty
and truthfulness in the suitors who seek its protection against the
dishonest practices of others, cannot consistently with its principles aid a party who proposes to sail by its indorsement under
false colors: and such has been the uniform decision of the courts
in this class of cases as to the original proprietors of trade-marks:
Pidding v. How, 8 Simons 477; Perry v. Trzufet, 6 Beav. 66:
Petridge v. Tells, 4 Abb. Pr. R. 144; Partridge v. 2fenck-,
How. App. Cases 547.
Although there is no case in the English or American courts,
so far as I am advised, directly deciding the question in harmony
with the position I have assumed, yet there is one case at least
where the court has recognised and acted upon the principle that
"the assignee of a trade-mark has no special privilege of deceiving the public even for its own benefit." This is the language
used by Justice GARDNER, in delivering an opinion of. the Court
of Appeals of .NewYork, in the case of Partridge v. Mtenck,
How. App. Cases 547. And he places the refusal to grant the
relief in that case distinctly upon the ground that the complainant had no standing in a court of equity, because the mark,
instead of indicating the manufacturer, was false, in that it was
the name of his assignor who sold him his secret, and authorized
the use of his name as a mark. This was a case where it was
conceded that, as a matter of fact, the article was as good as that
made by the assignor, and that neither the original manufacturer
nor the public were in fact defrauded. Upon this case I might
safely rely as entitled to more weight than the cases cited to
sanction the opposite doctrine. The profession, in their anxiety
to make the law subserve the wishes of their clients, have given
to the cases which seem to favor the opposite doctrine a scope
and importance to which they are not entitled. And the maxim,
stare decisis, frequently induces courts blindly to follow a case
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which is supposed to decide a legal proposition, without examin.
ing the grounds upon which the proposition is based. The maxim
is doubtless a salutary rule in that large class of cases where it
is more important that a rule should be established than that any
particular rule should be adopted. But when a proposition,
.announced as law, violates first principles, no number of repetitions, by the same or other courts, make it an authoritative rule.
In this case the most favorable aspect is, that the complainants
are the legal representatives of the Holbrook Manufacturing
Company by.operation of law, and as in this aspect it is a case
of first impression, even if I could sanction the doctrine of assignments to the extent sustained by the cases cited, as the counsel
for the complainants understands them, I know of no principle
upon which the complainants could be regarded as the legal
representatives of the corporation. But as I regard the whole
doctrine in relation to the right of legal representatives and
assignees to use thatrade-mark of the original proprietor, without
qualification, as vicious and contrary to equitable principles, I
could in no event sanction the doctrine until it is authoritatively
announced by the court of last resort. I do not deny that the
right to use the trade-mark of the original proprietor passes with
the good-will by operation of law to the executor and to the
assignee of a bankrupt, and that it may pass to an assignee by
express agreement between the parties. But I insist that in such
cases, in order to receive the aid of a court of equity, the parties
must add to the original trade-mark words indicating the authority for, and right to its use as executor, assignee, or successor
of the original proprietor, as the case may be. In other words,
assignees of trade-marks have no special privilege of sailing under
false colors, and if they will persist in doing so, prudence would
dictate that they give courts of equity a wide berth.

MOSELEY v. SCOTT ET AL.

Suuperior Court of Gincinnati.
MOSELEY v. SCOTT ET AL., OWNERS OF THE STEAMBOAT
"PRIMA DONNA."
By the maritime law, seamen must be cured of diseases incurred during their
employment, when not produced by their own fault, at the expense of the ship.
The statutes of the United States do not change the rule thus existing, except
In the requirement of a medicine-chest on board the vessel, and then there must
be proper directions for the administration of the remedies, or a suitable person to
prescribe them. The expense of food and nursing are still to be borne by the vessel.
The sailor engaged on board a steamboat on the Western rivers is entitled to
the same privileges as merchant seamen on foreign voyages.
The remedy in every proper case is not confined to the admiralty, but may be
Pursued in the state courts.

S. & B?. Mathews, for plaintiff.
Lincoln, Smith, & Tfarnock, for defendants.
Opinion of the court by
STORER, J.-This case is reserved from special term upon the
questions arising upon the demurrer to plaintiff's petition. The
plaintiff alleges " that the defendants were the owners of the
steamboat Prima Donna, navigating the waters of the rivers Ohio
and Cumberland, the boat being duly enrolled and licensed for
this purpose under the laws of the United States; that in the
month of Febriary 1864, the plaintiff shipped on board the boat
at the request and upon the employment of the defendants as
cabin boy at the agreed wages of twenty dollars per month for a
trip or voyage to Nashville, in the state of Tennessee, and back;
that during the voyage the plaintiff became and was sick with the
small-pox to such a degree that he was not able to attend to his
duty and was compelled to take his bed on the boat and there
remain while she was proceeding from Clarksville, Tennessee, to
Nashville, and thence to Evansville, in the state of Indiana, of
all which the master and officers of the boat had full notice.
That by reason of the premises it became the duty of the master
and officers to furnish the plaintiff during his confinement, for the
cure of his disease, sufficient medicine and medical attendance,
nursing, nourishment, lodging, bed and bedding, but they neglected their duty in this behalf, and did not provide and furnish
for the plaintiff what was required for his comfort and cure as
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before stated, by reason whereof, and by and through th6 mere
neglect, carelessness, and default of the master and officers 4f the
boat in the premises, the hands, feet, and legs of the plzintiff
while he was on board sick as aforesaid, became and were frozen,
so that the nails of his fingers came off, and it became necemary
to amputate both his feet; that in consequence thereof he was
confined in the hospital in Evansville, Indiana, for seven months,
suffering great pain, and is for ever incapacitated from earning
his living by his labor, for all which he claims damages."
To this petition a general demurrer is filed:
The defendants' counsel have taken exception to the mode in
which the plaintiff's cause of action is stated, assuming the allegations are not made with sufficient certainty, as well as infor
mally averred. These questions furnish the ground for a motion
to make the pleadings more definite, and cannot under the 88th
section of our Code be considered in the form they are now presented. Where no specific cause of demurrer is set forth, the
only matter for the court to decide is, whether upon the case
stated a sufficient cause of action appears.
It is claimed by the defendants' counsel in argument:
First. That the case made by the petition involves the ordinary
relation of master and servant only, consequently no obligation
is imposed on the employer to provide medical aid under the con
tract of hiring, or medicine in case of the employee's illness.
Second. If the rule thus stated is not applicable, the plaintiff
does not bring himself within the laws of the United States regulating the duties of merchant seamen, or those which apply to
ships and shipping on foreign voyages.
Third. If the plaintiff may claim the benefit of these laws, the
jurisdiction to afford relief is in the admiralty only.
It is argued that, at common law as well as by the practice of
the English courts, there is no obligation on the master to pay
for medical aid and the other necessary expenses of his servants'
sickness; but this rule, though apparently settled by authority,
has been doubted by eminent jurists, and will admit in a proper
case of a thorough examination of the grounds upon which it
rests.
Prior to the case of Scarman v. Castell, 1 Esp. N. P. C. 270,
it was said by Lord ALVANLEY in Wennall v. Adney, 3 B. & P.
241, "there is no authority in the law of England to be found
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which warrants the position assumed by Lord KENYON when he
decided in a former case ' that an apothecary might recover from
a master the amount of a bill for medicine and attendance furnished to and bestowed upon his servant while in the master's
house,' and although it was held ' his Lordship's opinion was not
an hasty one, but formed upon reflection,' it was nevertheless
overruled. Lord ELDON, in Simmons v. Tlilmott, 3 Esp. 93,
and Chief Justice MANSFIELD, in .Newby v. Wiltshire, 2 Esp.
739, were much inclined to sustain the opinion of Lord KENYON,
but with him were overruled in Wennall v. Adney. Since then
the current of decision is in harmony with the rule announced by
his Lordship. We find it so stated in Sellon v. Norman, 4 C. & P.
81, Cooper v. Phillips,Id. 581 ; though we are not able to appreciate the very nice distinction drawn by Judge TAU.TON\ between
the nurse who became sick while attending her mistress's.child, and
the servant girl who injured her limb, both being in service at the
time: See also Regina v. Smith, 8 C. &P. 153. But it is said by
Mr. Smith in his treatise upon Master and Servant, page 120, " It
is believed, however, no case has yet occurred in which the case
has arisen in an action by a servant against his master who had
agreed to supply the servant with necessary food, whether the
master in such a case is bound by his contract to furnish physic
to his servant in case of illness. When the question shall arise,
the decision must depend upon the exact nature of the contract
entered into." The English rule is recognised in Clark et al. v.
Waterman, 7 Vermont 76, and by Chancellor KENT, 2 Com.
We have referred to the cases on this branch of the argument,
to show that there can be no just analogy between the ordinary
hiring of a domestic servant who performs as in England agricultural or menial work only, and one who like the plaintiff has been
employed on board a steamboat navigating the waters of the
West. The difference in the mode of service, its nature and its
perils, distinguish it very clearly from all other vocations except
that which is required in the ordinary navigation of maritime vessels. We are not at liberty, therefore, if we would, to regard
the rule claimed by the defendants as applicable to the plaintiff's
action.
It is further claimed that the laws of the United States defining the duties of "merchant seamen," as well as the liabilities of
owners of vessels navigating the ocean, must determine the right
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of the mariner to indemnity; in other words, no right exists inde
pendent of these enactments.
We do not so understand these statutes, either in their letter
or spirit. When they were enacted the right of the seaman
already existed, not merely to his ordinary wages, but to all
appropriate relief in the admiralty on the general principles of
maritime law, and they were auxiliary merely to the existing
remedies as they recognised a present right. Thus we find by
the ancient marine ordinances, "if a man fall sick during the
voyage, or is hurt in the performance of his duty, he is to be
cured at the expense of the ship." We use the language of Lord
TENTERDEN, in his work on Shipping, chap. 34, page 258.
So it
is said by Molloy, vol. 2, chap. 3, § 5: "If the seaman do
become ill in the service of the ship he is to be provided for at the
charge of the ship ;" and in Emerigon, in his treatise on Insurance, Meredith Ed. chap. 12, § 41, under the head Illness of
Marines, it is stated without reservation that " the sailor who falls
sick during the voyage shall be cured at the expense of the vessel," and "sentence," he remarks, "was entered in the French
admiralty in 1750, admitting the charge for expenses of illness,
in which were comprised the fees of the physician and surgeon,
and the wages of a nurse." On this point there would seem to
be no doubt by the early authorities ; but the whole subject was
examined most thoroughly by Judge STORY, in Harden v. Gordon, 2 Mason 543, who exhausted all the learning his profound
investigation could reach, or his untiring industry could gather
from the past history of the law. He held, "by the general principles of law seamen are entitled to be healed at the expense of
the ship; the claim for such a provision in contemplation of law
being a part of the contract for wages, and a material ingredient
in the compensation for the labor and services of the seamen."
"I have not been able," he says, " to detect a single instance in
which the maritime laws of any country throw upon seamen disabled or taken sick in the service of the ship without their own
fault the expenses of their cure; this is certainly the law of
France, Denmark, Sweden, the Hanse Towns, Russia, and Holland."
The same question arose in the case of The Brig George, 1
Sumner 152, in which the law was again fully recognised, and
the mate of a vessel was allowed to charge the ship with the
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expenses of his cure when attacked with the yellow fever ; and
again, in eed et al. v. Ganfield, Id. 195, a seaman whose feet
were frozen while in the service of the ship, was held entitled to
be cured at the ship's expense. See also Nevitt v. Clarke et
al., Olcott's Rep. 306, where Judge BETTS decides the same
point, and 1 Abbott Adm. Rep. 344, where the same judge reaffirmed the principle; and so in Ware's Rep. 1, case of The Nhimrod, and the case of The Brig Forest, Id. 420, in which the
learned judge, as he always does, examines the doctrine from its
origin, and fully coincides with Judge Story. See also, Browne
v. Taber, Sprague 457; Browne v. Overton, Id. 462, 3 Kent
Com. 341.
These adjudications were not made upon the remedy given by
statute, but placed upon the principle that the laws of the United
States relating to merchant seamen are but in affirmance of a
right already conferred by the maritime law.
There are some exceptions, however, to the general application
of this rule. Thus, by the Act of Congress of July 20th 1790.
Brightly 614, " the vessel is exempted from the charge for medical advice for a sick seaman, provided there is on board a medicine chest with suitable directions for administering the remedies,"
but this requirement does not discharge the vessel from the expense of nursing and lodging, nor from the expense of medical
advice when there is no one on board competent to administer the
medicine: Lamson v. T/escott, 1 Sumner 595 ; Harden v. Gordon, already quoted; The Forest,Ware 420.
How far this provision of the statute may apply in the present
case, must depend on the proof offered on trial; it cannot be
regarded here, as the demurrer forbids the idea that the officers
of the boat had performed their duty, putting in issue only the
liability of the owners upon the case made in the petition.
If the rule is thus fully established as to foreign voyages when
merchant seamen, as they are denominated in the statute, are employed, may it not be extended to embrace the same class who
are engaged in the coasting trade; and does not such trade
include the navigation of the western rivers and lakes ?
This proposition at once presents an inquiry both important and
interesting to all who are engaged in our internal commerce as
owners, officers, or crews of steam-vessels.
In Sinith v. The Sloop Pekin, Gilpin 20, Judge HoPKINSON
overruled a plea in admiralty where a seaman employed on a

MOSELEY v. SCOTT ET AL.

voyage between parts of adjoining states, and on the tide water
of a river or bay, libelled the vessel for his wages, when it was
sought to dismiss the suit on the ground the court had no jurisdiction; and Judge SPRAGUE, in the case of -Derby et al. v.
Henry, 21 Law Reporter 473, sustained a suit in rem for wages
against a vessel of thirty-five tons burthen, engaged in transporting lumber between Quincy and Boston, the distance of a few
miles only ; and in Knight v. Parsons,Sprague 279, it was held
that fishermen on mackerel voyages in licensed and enrolled
vessels are to be cured at the ship's expense, and the rule applicable to hired seamen on foreign voyages, embraced them also.
By the law of February 20th 1845, Congress invested the District Courts of the United States with very extended powers,
conferring jurisdiction in admiralty " in all matters of contract
and tort arising in or upon or concerning steamboats or other
vessels of twenty tons burthen and upwards, enrolled and licensed
for the coasting trade, and at the time employed in business of
commerce and navigation between ports and places in different
states and territories upon the lakes and navigable waters connecting the same, as are possessed and exercised by the said courts in
cases of the like steamboats and other vessels employed in commerce and navigation on the high seas or tide waters within the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States."
That jurisdiction before the passage of this law was confined
to those waters where the tide ebbed and flowed, and was denied
by the courts except in that class of cases: Steamboat Orleans
v. Phoebus, 11 Peters 175; W'aring v. Clark, 5 Howard 441.
This law came under consideration in 12 Howard 450, in the
case of The Genesee Chief, and its constitutionality was fully
sustained on the ground that the ebb and flow of the tide did not
determine admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, but that the lakes
and navigable waters were within the scope of that jurisdiction
as known and understood in the United States when the Constitution was adopted.
But it was doubtful whether the navigable rivers of the west
were embraced within the terms of the law; and the same court,
in Owners of Steamboat Wetumpka v. Steamboat Magnolia, 20
Howard 296, held that the District Court of Alabama had competent admiralty jurisdiction by the Judiciary Act of 1789, thereby giving their proper character to the vast channels of internal
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commerce, navigable not only for vessels of "ten or twelve tons
burthen," but for those of equal capacity with ocean ships. See
also the case of The Propeller Commerce, 1 Black 574.
The legislation of Congress does not stop here ; it has required
all steamboats to be enrolled and licensed as in the case of coasting vessels; it compels all seamen employed in their navigation
to pay into the treasury twenty cents for each month of their service as hospital money, securing thereby the privilege of being
cared for as merchant seamen are in the marine hospitals of the
government, where any exist, if not, to be cured at the government's expense. By a series of acts beginning in 1812, and
from thence continued to the present time, the lading and navigation of boats on the rivers of the United States are specially
regulated, the duties of the officers and crews clearly defined,
and heavy penalties imposed for their disobedience or neglect.
As early as 1812, by the statute admitting Louisiana into the
Union, it was declared "that all the shores and waters of the
Ohio river, and the several rivers and creeks entering into the
same, as well as all the shores and waters of the Mississippi, and
its heads, were made a part of the district of the Mississippi, and
surveyors of customs were appointed for various ports on these
rivers, among which was Cincinnati :" Brightly 586, §§ 19 and 20 ;
and by a subsequent law of 1831, merchandise may be imported
from foreign countries directly to these interior ports, the owner
giving bond at the port of delivery for the duties.
If then it can, as we believe, be properly maintained, that for
all practical purposes, both as to right and remedy, seamen navigating our great rivers and lakes are to be regarded as merchant
seamen, another question arises, have we jurisdiction over the
case before us, or is it to be referred to the admiralty exclusively ?
In all the statutes conferring jurisdiction on the admiralty courts,
the Congress of the United States has been careful to confine the
authority, where it is exclusively given, to suits in rem, and not
inpersonam;it is so in the law of 1845, and expressly stated in
the law of 1790, regulating merchant seamen; both these enactments reserve to the seaman the right to sue in the common law
courts, and this is the construction given by the United States'
courts: New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6
Howard 390 ; Ashbrook v. Golden Gate, Newberry. 296 ; indeed,
the numerous decisions we find in the reports of the state courts,
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where the rights of seamen are directly litigated with the owners
of the vessel, remove all doubt as to their concurrent jurisdiction
with the admiralty tribunals. A contrary construction of the law
would invest the admiralty with exclusive power over every ques
tion touching maritime rights; every claim under a policy of marine
insurance, bills of lading, charter-party, and bottomry, would
belong alone to that tribunal, and but a small portion of commercial law be left for the adjudication of the common law courts.
The argument of defendants' counsel has extended bver a wide
field, and is attempted to be sustained by many illustrations,
which, though ingeniously put, do not produce conviction.
We- have been told the language of the law prescribing the
duties of merchant seamen is, that none are regarded as such
except every requirement is fulfilled; ez. gratia,there must be
shipping articles signed before the precise limit of the voyage is
ascertained, and the consent of the sailorgiven to the relation he
has assumed, which is in fact to submit to all the penalties thereby imposed before the ship leaves her port. These, and many
other provisQes, demanded for the safety of the seaman, as well
as the proper discharge of his duties, are declaratory rather than
arbitrary in their language. We cannot believe the absence of
either precludes the enforcement of any right secured by the
maritime law to those who navigate the seas. We suppose the
shipping-paper is but the evidence, and the best evidence, of the
contract between the owners and master and the seaman; if no
such paper exists, the agreement, as in other cases, must be proved
by parol, though it may subject all parties to inconvenience, and
produce difficulty in establishing their several rights. In the
case of The Trial, 1 Blatch. & Howland 94, Judge BETTS held
that the right of the seaman did not depend on the shipping articles,
and he was not obliged to call for them to establish his claim to
wages. And Judge HOPKINSON, in Janson et al. v. The .Russian
Ship Heinrich,Crabbe 226, decided, -" when a sailor enters upon
a voyage without signing shipping articles, an implied contract is
presumed that he has shipped for the voyage, and he is botmd
accordingly."
In a similar manner the other objections urged by counsel may
be readily disposed of, and the real question which after all is
involved in this controversy, decided-Are not the seamen on the
western waters, who assist in the navigation of enrolled and
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iicensed vessels, under the Acts of Congress, on every just principle to sustain the same relation to the master and owner as a
mariner on a merchant ship engaged in a foreign voyage ?
Neither upon authority nor any principle of justice do we
understand such a distinction can be properly assumed, much less
vindicated. The term foreign voyage, when the law of 1790 was
passed, had, we are satisfied, a meaning limited by the then existing condition of things. Our commerce, with the exception of
the few vessels engaged in the coasting trade, was principally with
Europe and the West Indies. The inland seas of the West were
not as well known to our people, either geographically or commercially, as the Mediterranean, the Baltic, or the Euxine; each
lake was literally a "mare elauaum." The sources of the Mississippi and Missouri had not yet been explored, and were as
unknown as those of the Nile, while the navigation of. the Ohio
and her tributaries was confined to canoes, with the occasional
pasiage of a batteau or a flat-boat.
But in the progress of events this immense basin, whose waters
flow into the Atlantic, has unfolded its treasures, and demanded
the facilities adapted to its vast resources. Produce must be
transported thousands of miles, and the wants of trade supplied ;
in accomplishing which more degrees of latitude are traversed
than are found between New York and London, while the distance between-ipany foreign ports and our own, espeeially in the
British Provinces and the West India Islands, is not to be measured by an ordinary voyage from Pittsburgh to New Orleans.
The millions of products, and the necessities of trade, not only
now-demand the largest facilities for transportation throughout
and beyond our valley, but all the securities for those who take
part in the work of locomotion which ar6 granted by the maritime
law, should be allowed to the largest extent and with the greatest
liberality. Though it is said there are many circumstances attending a foreign voyage which give a peculiar character to the employment of the mariner who engages to perform it, such as the
variety of climate, peril of the seas, and a removal from the
direct protection of the government, we cannot but believe the
duties devolving on the crew of a steamer on our rivers, when
fully considered, are equally important, and the danlgers to be
encountered as imminent as are met in an ocean voyage. There is
the same diversity of climate, the same contingencies of tempest,
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flood, and collision, the same responsibility as carriers, and the
same obligation to labor for the safety of the vessel and cargo,
in case of accident.
We confess, that from whatever point of view we consider the
question, we are strengthened in our conviction that the western
sailor is to every legal intent a merchant seaman, and is privileged to demand the same immunities. We might refer not merely
to the physical condition of the West, which has made the extension of admiralty jurisdiction a commercial necessity, to explain
our views of the question now in controversy, and we think, without apology for any imagined departure from the points discussed,
we may allude to the fact that the last four years have exhibited
what has already become historical, that the steamboats upon our
rivers and lakes have been the nurseries of thousands of brave
men who have manned our naval vessels, and sustained with
honor the flag of their country ; nor ought we to forget that
during the same period these same rivers have floated a larger
armed fleet than is sustained by any European government, England and France excepted. There is then a fitness that any real
or technical distinction between the ocean and our western rivers,
between fresh water and salt water, whether streams flow on continuously or rise and ebb as the sea, should no longer be permitted
to exist. The progress of events has removed all reason for any
such diversity, and we cannot find any legal principle is violated
by extending all the privileges of the statute we have referred to,
to our inland navigation. Vessels have already left our ports
for foreign countries laden with our own products, and merchandise is directly imported here from every part of Europe, and we
may well predict that ere long we shall have ports of entry practically from which there will be a direct communication with every
part of the globe. With these views of the future we may well
ignore the past, and apply the proper rule for present duty. The
case stated in the petition meets every requirement of the maritime law, or the usages of commerce, to constitute a right of action.
A seaman within the full protection of the law becomes suddenly
ill while on board a steamboat, where he had contracted to serve
for the voyage, and up to the time of his illness performed his
duty; the owners of the boat, the master and his officers, were
bound to furnish medicine, nursing, and medical aid suitable to
the treatment of his disease, but he is neglected. In mid-winter,
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as he alleges, while on board the vessel, and legally under their
care and protection, his limbs are frozen, the nails fall from his
fingers, and his feet are afterwards amputated to save his life.
All these facts are admitted by the demurrer, and, until they are
disproved, establish a clear right to recover. It is to be hoped,
when the real state of fact is proved, the case may assume a different aspect. On the pleadings the demurrer will be overruled,
and the cause remanded, with leave to answer.

Supreme Court of the United States.
ADAM VAN ALLEN, IN BEHALF OF HIMSELF AND ALL OTHER
STOCKHOLDERS IN THE FIRST NATION'AL BANK OF ALBANY,
PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, v. MICHAEL A. NOLAN ET AL., AS THE
BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF THE CITY OF ALBANY.
Taxation of National Banks by State Authority.
IE Cnuruxt, all the judges concurring.
I. Taxation-State law must conform to Act of Congress.-The Act of Congress
of June 3d 1864 authorizes the taxation by the states of shares in the national
banks, with this limitation: "that the tax so imposed under the laws of any state
upon the shares of the associations authorized by this act shall not exceed the rate
imposed upon the shares of any of the banks organized under the authority of the
state where such association is located :" Held, that a state law, providing for the
taxation of the shares of the national banks and for the taxation of the capitalof
state banks, but not of the shares, did not conform to the limitation in the Act
of Congress.
.Argument.-Inasmuch as the capital of state banks may consist of United States securities,
which are exempt from state taxation, a tax on capital is not an equivalent for a tax on
the shares of the stockholders.

By THE CounT: CHASE, C. J., and W.&va and Swimn, JJ., dissenting.
'2. Shares taxablewithout regardto mode in which capital is invested.-The above
Act of Congress authorizes the shares in national banks to be taxed by state
authority, irrespective of the amount of capital which the bank itself may have
invested in the bonds of the United States.
The minority of the court dissent from this view, holding that the states may
tax shares in a national bank only so far as its capital is not invested ;n United
States securities.
A~rumen.-1. A tax on shares is nat a tax on the capitol of the bank. The bank, as a cot
paratton, owns the bnds, and not the individual stockholders. Bonds owned by the bank
cannot be taxed against the bank; but the interest of tb shareholder is an Independent
property,
and
mayupon
be taxed.
2. interest
The tax or
allowed
is nat
a tax
the bands, but is part of the price of the grea± ibwees
and privileges conferred upon these banking associations, founded upon a new use and
application of the bnds for banking purposes.
[The soundoes of these arguments Is dented by the dissenting Judges.]

3. Power of taxation concurrent in Congress and the States.-As a rule, the
power of taxation is a concurrent power. Congress may withhold the power,
VOL. XIV.-39
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and, by vir ie of its paramount authority, exclude the states, or it may leave t"
states free to act. An exception to the rule excludes the states from taxing the
means, agencies, or instruments of the General Government.
4. QuEnE, by CHA E, C. J.-Has Congress power, under the Constitution, to
authorize state taxation of national securities, directly or indirectly f
5. QuEnz.-Can states, whose policy does not allow the organization of banks
and provide for the taxation of shares, lawfully tax shares of the national banks?
[See concluding part of opinion of CHASE, C. J.]

THE opinion of the court was delivered by
NELSON, J.-This is a writ of error to the Court of Appeals
of the state of New York. The case presented is this: The
plaintiffs in error are stockholders in the First National Bank in
the city of Albany, and the defendants constitute a board of
assessors of taxes in the same city. The whole of the capital
8tock of the bank consisted in stocks and bonds issued by the
United States under various Acts of Congress ; and it was insisted
before the board that the shares of the bank held by the plaintiffs
as stockholders were not subject to assessment and taxation under
state authority, which position was denied by the board, and the
assessment made and the tax enforced. The case was carried to
the Supreme Court of the state, and thence to the Court of
Appeals, which court affirmed the authority of the board of assessors to levy the tax.
The case is now before us, under the 25th section of the
Judiciary Act. The decree of the Court of Appeals must be
reversed, on the ground that the enabling act of the state, passed
March 9th 1865 (sess. 1, ch. 97), does not conform to the limitations by the Act of Congress, passed June 3d 1864, organizing
the national banks, and providing for their taxation (§ 41). The
defect is this: one of the limitations in the Act of Congress is,
" that the tax so imposed under the laws of any state upon the
shares of the associations authorized by this act shall not exceed
the rate imposed upon the shares of any of the banks organized
under the authority of the state where such association is located."
The enabling act of the state contains no such limitation. The
banks of the state are taxed upon their capital, and although the
act provides that the tax on the shares of the national banks shall
not exceed the par value, yet, inasmuch as the capital of the state
banks may consist of the bonds of the United States, which are
exempt from state taxation, it is easy to see that this tax on the
capital is not an equivalent for a tax on the shares of the stock-
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holders
This is an unimportant question, however, as the defect
may be readily remedied by the state legislature. The main and
important question involved, and the one which has been argued
at great length and with eminent ability, is, whether the state
possesses the power to authorize the taxation of the shares of
these national banks in the hands of stockholders, whose capital
is wholly vested in stock and bonds of the United States. The
court are of opinion that this power is possessed by the state, and
that it is due to the several cases that have been so fully and
satisfactorily argued before us at this term, as well as to the
public interest involved, the question should be finally disposed
of; and we shall proceed, therefore, to state, as briefly as practicable, the grounds and reasons that have led to our judgment
inthe case.
The first act providing for the organization of these national
banks, passed 25th February 1863, contained no provision concerning state taxation of these shares; but Congress reserved the
right, by the last section, at any time "to amend, alter, or repeal
the act." The present Act of 1864 is a re-enactment of the prior
statute, with some material amendments, of which the section
concerning state taxation is one.
In organizing these banks under this act, it is made the duty
of the association to deliver to the Treasurer of the United States
registered bonds, bearing interest, to an amount not less than
thirty thousand dollars, nor less than one-third of the capital
stock paid in; which bonds shall be deposited with the treasurer,
and by him safely kept, &c. This provision fixes the minimum
limit of the amount of the bonds to be deposited with the treasurer,
but no maximum is fixed, and the whole amount of the capital
may be invested in them. On the deposit of these bonds with
the treasurer, the association is entitled to receive from the
Comptroller of the Currency circulating notes of different denominations, registered and countersigned, equal in amount to ninety
per centum of the current market value of the bonds so deposited.
(§ 21.) There is a limit as to the amount of the circulating cur
rency to be issued to these associations, not to exceed, in the
aggregate, three hundred millions of dollars. This sum was to
be apportioned among the several banks organized under the act.
(§ 22.) These notes, after being signed by the president and
cashier, are authorized to be issued and to circulate as money,
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and are to be received at par in all parts of the United States,
in payment of taxes, excises, public lands, and all other dues to
the United States, except for duties on imports; also, for all
salaries and other debts and demands owing by the
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except interest on the public debt, and in redemption of the
national currency. (§ 23.)
These associations also possess all the powers necessary for
carrying on the business of banking, by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences
of debt; by receiving deposits, buying and selling exchange, coin,
and bullion; by loaning money on personal security; by obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes according to the provisions of
this act, &c. The duration of the charter is twenty years.
They are also made depositories of public moneys, when designated by the Secretary of the Treasury, and may be employed
as fiscal agents of the government.
Now, these are very great powers and privileges conferred by
the act upon these associations, and which are founded upon a
new use and application of these government bonds, especially
the privilege of issuing notes to circulate in the community as
money, to the amount of ninety per centum of the bonds deposited
with the treasurer, thereby nearly doubling their amount for all
the operations and business purposes of the bank. This currency
furnishes means and facilities for conducting the operations of the
associations, which, if used wisely and skilfully, cannot but result
in great advantages and profits to all the members of the association-the shareholders of the bank.
In the granting of chartered rights and privileges by goverm
ment, especially if of great value to the corporators, certain
burdens are usually, if not generally, imposed as conditions of
the grant. Accordingly, we find them in this charter. They are
very few, but distinctly stated.
They are, first, a duty of one-half of one per centum each half
year upon the average amount of its notes in circulation ; second,
a duty of one-quarter of one per centum each half year upon the
average amount of its deposits; third, a duty of one-quarter of
one per centum each half year on the average amount of its
capital stock beyond the amount invested in United States bonds;
and fourth, a state tax upon the shares of the association held by
the stockholders, not greater than assessed on other moneyed
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capital in the state, nor to exceed the rate on shares of stock of
state banks.
These are the only burdens annexed to the enjoyment of the
great chartered rights and privileges that we find in this Act
of Congress ; and no objection is made to either of them except
the last-the limited state taxation.
Although it has been suggested, yet it can hardly be said to
have been argued, that the provision in the Act of Congress concerning the taxation of the shares by the state is unconstitutional.
The suggestion is, that it is a tax by the state upon the bonds
of the government which constitute the capital of the bank, and
which this court has heretofore decided to be illegal. But this
suggestion is scarcely well founded; for were we to admit, for
the sake of the argument, this to be a tax of the bonds or capital
stock of the bank, it is but a tax upon the new uses and new
privileges conferred by the charter of the association ; it is but
a condition annexed to the enjoyment of this new use and new
application of the bonds ; and if Congress possessed the power
to grant these new rights and new privileges, which none of the
learned counsel has denied, and which the whole argument assumes,
then we do not see but the power to annex the conditions is equally
clear and indisputable. The question involved is altogether a
different one from that decided in the previous bank cases, and
stands upon different considerations. The state tax under this
Act of Congress involves no question as to the pledged faith of
the government. The tax is the condition for the new rights and
privileges conferred upon these associations.
But, in addition to this view, the tax on the shares is not a tax
on the capital of the bank. The corporation is the legal owner
of all the property of the bank, real and personal; and within
the powers conferred upon it by the charter, and for the purposes
for which it was created, can deal with the corporate property as
absolutely as a private individual can deal with his own. This
is familiar law, and will be found in every work that may be
opened on the subject of corporations. A striking exemplification
may be seen in the case of The Queen v. Arnoud, 9 A. & E.
(N. S.) 806. The question related to the registry of a ship
owned by a corporation. Lord DENMAN observed: "It appears
to me that the British corporation is, as such, the sole owner of
the ship. The individual members of the corporation are, no
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doubt, interested in one sense in the property of the corporation,
as they may derive individual benefits from its increase, or loss
from its decrease, but in no legal sense are the individual members the owners."
The interest of the shareholder entitles him to participate in
'the net profits earned by the bank in the employment of its
capital, during the existence of its charter, in proportion to the
number of his shares, and, upon its dissolution, or termination,
to his proportion of the property that may remain of the corporation after the payment of its debts. This is a distinct, independent interest or property, held by the shareholder like any other
property that may belong to him. Now, it is this interest which
the Act of Congress has left subject to taxation by the states,
under the limitations prescribed, as will be seen on referring to it.
That act provides as follows:"That nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent all the
shares of any of the said associations, held by any person or body
corporate, from being included in the valuation of personal pro.
perty of such person or .corporation in the assessment of taxes
imposed by and under state authority, at the place where such
bank is located, and not elsewhere, but not at a greater rate than
is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual'
citizens of such state : Providedfurther, That the tax so imposed
under the laws of any state, upon the shares of the associations
authorized by this act, shall not exceed the rate imposed upon
the shares of any of the banks organized under the authority
of the state where such association is located: Provided also,
That nothing in this act shall exempt the real estate of associations from either state, county, or municipal taxes to the same
extent according to its value as other real estate is taxed."
(§41.)
It is said that Congress possesses no power to confer upon a
state authority to be exercised which has been exclusively delegated to that body by the Constitution, and, consequently, that
it cannot confer upon a state that sovereign right of taxation;
nor is a state competent to receive a grant of any such power
from Congress. We agree to this.
But, as it respects a subject-matter over which Congress and
the states may exercise a concurrent power, but from the exercise
of which Congress, by.reason of its paramount authority, may
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exclude the states, there is no doubt Congress may withhold the
exercise of that authority and leave the states free to act. An
example of this relation existing between the federal and state
governments is found in the pilot laws of the states, and the
health and quarantine laws.
The power of taxation under the Constitution as a general rule,
and as has been repeatedly recognised in adjudged cases in this
court, is a concurrent power. The qualifications of the rule are
the exclusion of the states from the taxation of the means and
instruments employed in the exercise of the functions of the
Federal Government.
The remaining question is, has Congress legislated in respect
to these associations so as to leave the shares of the stockholders
subject to state taxation ?
We have already referred to the main provision of the Act
of Congress on this subject, and it will be seen it declares 1 that
nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent all the shares in
any of the said associations held by any person, or body corporate, from being included in the valuation of the personal
property of such person or corporation in the assessment of taxes
imposed by or under state authority, at the place where such
bank is located ;" and in another section of the act (§ 40) it is
declared "1that the president and cashier of every such association shall cause to be kept, at all times, a full and correct list
of the names and residences of all the shareholders in the association, and the number of shares held by each, in the office where
its business is transacted, and such list shall be subject to the
inspection of all shareholders and creditors of the association,
and the officers authorized to assess taxes under state authority,
during business hours of each day," &c.'
These two provisions-the one declaring that nothing in the act
shall be construed to prevent the shares from being included in
the valuation of the personal property, &c., in the assessment of
taxes imposed by state authority; and the other providing for
the keeping of the list of names and residences of the shareholders, among other things, for the inspection of the officers
authorized to assess the state taxes-not only recognise, in express
terms, the sovereign right of the state to tax, but prescribes regulations and duties to these associations, with a view to disembarrass the officers of the state engaged in the exercise of this right.
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Nothing, it would seem, could be made plainer, or more direct
and comprehensive, on the subject. The language of the several
provisions is so explicit and positive as scarcely to call for judicial
construction.
Then, 'as to the shares, and what is intended by the use of the
term ? The language of the act is equally explicit and decisive.
The persons forming an association are required to make a certificate, which shall specify, among other things, the amount of
its capital stock, and the number of shares into which the same
shall be divided, the names and places of residence of the shareholders, and the number of shares held by each. (§ 6.)
The capital stock shall be divided into shares of one hundred
dollars each, and shall be deemed personal property. The shareholders of the association shall be held individually responsible,
equally and rateably, and not one for another, for all contracts,
debts, and engagements of such association, to the extent of the
amount of their stock therein at the par value, in addition to the
amount invested in such-shares. (§ 12.)
In the election of directors, and in deciding all questions at
meetings of shareholders, each shareholder shall be entitled to
one vote on each share of stock held by him. (§ 11.) Fifty per
centum of the capital stock of every association shall be paid in
before it shall commence business, and the remainder in instalments of at least ten per centum per month till the whole amount
is paid ; and if any shareholder, or his assignee, shall fail to make
the payment, or any instalment on his stock, the directors may
sell the stock at public auction. (§§ 14, 15.) No association shall
make any loan or discount on the security of the shares of its own
capital. (§ 35.)
We have already referred to the list of the names and residences of the shareholders, and the number of shares, to be kept
for the inspection of the state assessors.
Now, in view of these several provisions in which the term
shares and shareholders are mentioned, and the clear and obvious
meaning of the term in the connection in which it is found, namely,
the whole of the interest in the shares and of the shareholders,
when the statute provides that nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent all the shares in any of the said associations,
&c., from being included in the valuation of the personal property
of any person or corporation in the assessment of taxes imposed
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by state authority, &c., can there be a doubt but that the term
" shares," as used in this connection, means the same interest as
when used in the other portions of the act? Take, for examples,
the use of the term in the certificate of the numbers of shares in
the articles of association; in the division of the capital stock
into shares of one hundred dollars each-; in the personal liability
clause, which subjects the shareholder to an amount, and, in addition, to the amount invested in such shares; in the election of
directors, and in deciding all questions at meetings of the stockholders, each share is entitled to one vote; in regulations of the
payments of the shares subscribed; and, finally, in the list of
shares kept for the inspection of the state assessors. In all these
instances it is manifest that the term as used means the entire
interest of the shareholder; and it would be singular if, in the
use of the term in the connection of state taxation, Cogress intended a totally different meaning without any indication of such
intent.
This is an answer to the argument that the term, as used here,
means only the interest of the shareholder as representing the
portion of the capital, if any, not invested in the bonds of the
government, and that the state assessors must institute an inquiry
into the investment of the capital of the bank, and ascertain what
portion is invested in these bonds, and -make a discrimination in
the assessment .of the shares. If Congress had intended any such
discrimination, it would have been an easy matter to have said
so. Certainly, so grave and important a change in the use of
this term, if so intended, would not have been left to judicial
construction.
Upon the whole, after the maturest consideration we have been
able to give to this case, we are satisfied that the states possess
the power to tax the whole of the interest of the shareholder in
the shares held by him in these associations, within the limit prescribed by the act authorizing" their organization.
But, for the reasons stated in the forepart of the opinion, the
judgment must be reversed and the case remitted to the Court of
Appeals of the state of New York, with directions to enter judgment for the plaintiffs in error, with costs.
CHASE , C. J.-The court is unanimous in the opinion that the
judgment of the Court of Appeals of New York must be reversed,
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because the shares of the national banking associations are not
taxed by the law of New York according to one branch of the
rule prescribed by the Act of Congress; that is to say, as the
shares of the banks of the State are taxed.
A minority of the members of the court, however, is unable to
concur, upon one very important point, with the opinion just read.
That opinion maintains the proposition that, under the national
currency acts, the shares of the capital of national banking associations are subject to state taxation without any reference to the
amount of such capital invested in bonds of the United States.
We think that such taxation is actual, though indirect, taxation
of the bonds; that it is matter of doubt whether, under the Constitution, Congress has power, without express reservation in the
loan acts, to authorize such taxation ; and that taxation by the
states of the shares of national banking associations, without
reference to the amount of the capital invested in national securities, is not authorized, nor was intended to be authorized by
Congress.
We will proceed to state the grounds of this opinion.
By an act passed February 25th 1863, Congress provided for the
organization of national banking associations, for the purpose of
enabling the National Government to execute more effectually its
constitutional powers and functions; and the act was amended
and re-enacted on the 3d June 1864.
[Here the Chief Justice epitomizes the main provisions of the
several Acts of Congress, which we omit.]
It is unnecessary to examine further the various provisions by
which the powers and duties and functions of these national banking associations are more particularly ascertained and regulated.
The general purpose of the Act of Congress cannot be misconceived. It is to authorize the organization of associations to be
employed, not only in the service of the government as depositories and financial agents, but especially in facilitating the collection of internal duties, and the transfer and disbursement of public
moneys, and in furnishing to the people a safe and uniform note
circulation, convertible immediately into notes of the United
States, and to be made convertible into coin as soon as the government shall provide for the payment of its own notes in that
medium.
The qualities, powers, and duties, as national agencies, of these
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associations, resemble, in almost all essential particulars, those of
the Bank of the United States authorized by the Act of April 10th
1816. Like that bank, they are organized under national legislation. Their capital, like four-fifths of the capital of that bank,
is supplied by individual subscriptions. They are employed, like
that bank, as agents and depositories of the National Government.
While that bank, however, was organized as one great moneyed
corporation, with power to establish branches in the several states,
subject to its central power, these associations, under the limitations prescribed by Congress, are formed whenever and wherever
citizens, possessing the necessary means, see fit to organize under
the law; and they are subject to no control except that of the
government executing the law. It is also to be remembered that
while the notes of that bank represented nothing but securities
held by the bank itself, and were expected to form biut a small
part of the note circulation of the country, the notes of these associations, besides being secured as to immediate redemption by the
several associations, which pay them out, through the depositlof
United States bonds, are, in substance and to all practical intents,
the obligations of the government itself; and are intended, in
connection with the notes issued directly by the government, to
supply the entire note circulation of all the states and all the territories of the Union.
These observations show that the national banking associations
are much more intimately connected in their functions and operations with the National Government than was the Bank of the
United States. They are therefore entitled to all the protection
and all the immunities to which that bank was entitled.
The relations of that bank to the government, and its right to
protection from state interference and control, were fully considered in the case of McCulloch v. The State of illfaryland,
decided in 1819, and again in the case of Osborne v. The Bank
of the United States, decided in 1824.
That Congress may constitutionally organize or constitute
agencies for carrying into effect the national powers granted by
the Constitution; that these agencies may be organized by the
voluntary association of individuals, sanctioned by Congress ; that
Congress may give to such agencies, so organized, corporate
unity, permanence, and efficiency; and that such agencies in their
being, capital, franchises, and operations, are not subject to tho
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taxing power of the states, have ever been regarded, since those
decisions, as settled doctrines of this court.
Those decisions were the judgments of great men and great
judges. They were pronounced by the most illustrious of their
number, and are distinguished by his peculiar clearness and
cogency of reasoning. For nearly half a century the principles
vindicated by them have borne the keen scrutiny of an enlightened
profession, and the sharp criticism of able statesmen; and they
remain unshaken. All the judges who concurred in them have
descended, long since, into honored graves; but their judgments
endure, and, gathering vigor from time and general consent, have.
acquired almost the force of constitutional sanctions.
We assume then, that the national banking associations, as
such, and in their powers, functions, and operations, are not
subject to taxation by the states, on the ground that state laws
imposing such taxation are repugnant to the law of Congress by
which they are established and sanctioned.
"'o[After referring to Weston v. Uharlestown, 2 Pet. 449, and
recent New York cases (2 Black 628, and 2 Wallace), the Chief
Justice proceeds.]
And it may now be regarded as settled law that the national
securities forming part of the property of individual citizens or
associations, or of the capital of banks or banking associations, are
not subject to taxation by or under state authority.
But it was urged in argument that though the capital of a bank,
so far as it consists of national securities, is exempt from state
taxation, the shares of that capital may be taxed without reference to the legislation of Congress, and without regard to the
national securities which they represent.
If this were admitted, it would follow that the legislature of
New York, by merely shifting its taxation from the capital to the
shares, might have avoided the whole effect of the exemptions
sanctioned by the decisions just cited. The same tax on the
same identical property, without any exemption of national securities, might have been assessed and collected by adopting the
simple expedient of assessment on the shares of capital instead of
the aggregate of capital-on the parts instead of the whole. The
whole tax, too, might have been collected from the very same officers who were authorized by those decisions to refuse payment of
so much of it as was derived from national securities, by adopt-
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ing the equally simple expedient of requiring those officers to
deduct the tax on the shares from the accruing dividends and pay
it over to the state collector.
We do not understand the majority of the court as asserting
that shares of capital invested in national securities could be
taxed without authority from Congress. We certainly cannot
yield our assent to any such proposition. To do so would, in our
judgment, deprive the decisions just cited of all practical value
and effect, and make the exemption from state taxation of national
securities held by banks as investments of capital wholly unreal
and illusory.
We will consider the question, therefore, as one of construction.
The majority of the court hold that the Act of Congress,
rightly construed, subjects the shares of the national associations
to taxation by the states, without regard to investment of a part
or the whole of their capital in national securities ; and that the
act thus construed is warranted by the Constitution. We dissent.
It may well be questioned, in our judgment, whether Congress
has power under the Constitution to authorize state taxation of
national securities, either directly or indirectly.
Taxation of national securities is taxation upon the contracts
of the United States, and may be regarded, not unreasonably, as
impairing their obligation, unless provision is made for such taxation in the laws authorizing the loans for which they are issued.
It is not alleged that any such provision is contained in the acts
under which the government issued the bonds held by the national
banking associations. On the contrary, these acts contain ex.
press stipulations with the national creditors that the bonds
issued under them shall be exempt from taxation by or under
state or municipal authority. This is, in effect, a stipulation on
the part of Congress that the takers of the government loan shall
have the right to use the bonds issued to them for any lawful
purpose free from state or municipal taxation.
Can Congress, notwithstanding this stipulation, authorize states
to tax these bonds indirectly by taxing the capital or the shares
of capital invested in them?
There is sufficient reason, we think, for a negative answer, to
make it our duty not to presume without the clearest evidence'
that Congress has actually authorized such taxation.
And were the power to authorize such taxation clear, a supe.
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rior question would remain-the question of good faith, of public
virtue, of national honor.
We come, then, to the construction of the act.
In enacting the National Bank Law, Congress must have had in
view the great principles already established by the decisions of
this court: 1. That states cannot tax the agencies of the National
Government. 2. That states cannot tax the national securities in
the hands of individual citizens. 3. That states cannot tax the
national securities in which may be invested the whole or a part
of the capital of any association or corporation.
They also had in view, doubtless, the exception to exemption
suggested by Chief Justice MARSHALL in McCulloch v. far/land, when he said that the opinion of the court did "not extend
to a tax paid by the real property of the bank in common with
the real property within the state, nor to a tax imposed on the
interest which the citizens of Maryland might hold in the institution in common with the property of the same description throughout the state."
With these principles and this exception in view, Congress, in
order that nothing might be left to inference, expressly authorized
state taxation of the real estate held by the national banking
associations, and of the interests of private citizens in them. This
was done by three provisos to the forty-first section, which prescribed measure and rule of national taxation. These provisos
are as follows:
1. "Provided, That nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent all the shares in any of said associations, held by any person
or body incorporate, from being included in the valuation of the
personal property of such person or corporation in the assessment
of taxes imposed by or under state authority, at the place where
such bank is located, and not elsewhere, but not at a greater rate
than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such state. 2. Providedfurtler, That the
tax so imposed under the laws of any state shall not exceed the
rate imposed upon the shares in any of the banks organized under
authority of the state where such association is located. 3. Provided also, That nothing in this act shall exempt the real estate
of associations from either state, county, or municipal taxes to
the same extent, according to its value, as other real estate is
taxed."
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We do not doubt the power of Congress to enact these provisog. The only ground upon which exemption from state taxes
of the capital, franchises, operations, or property of corporations
or associations has been adjudged by this court, is that of the
repugnancy of such taxation to the Acts of Congress organizing
such corporations or associations, and making them the agencies
or instruments of the National Government.
The doctrine is, that Congress may create corporations or
authorize associations as means, instruments, or agents, for the
execution of national powers, and that such corporations or associations, being such means, instruments, or agents, are exempted
from state taxation. But such corporations and associations must
be organized in such manner, under such limitations, and with
such liabilities as Congress may see fit to prescribe. If in the
judgment of Congress, therefore, the purposes of their. organization will be better or more safely fulfilled if subjected, in some
respects, to state taxation, the acts authorizing their establishment may be so framed as to allow such taxation, excepting probably, national securities, as already suggested.
We proceed to consider the effect of these provisos ; pausing
only to observe that there is nothing in the suggestion of Chief
Justice MARSHALL, in conformity with which they were probably

framed, which warrants any"inference that it ever entered into
his mind that the national stock or bonds could be taxed indirectly, by taxing the interest of citizens in the Bank of the
United States. The question of state taxes upon national securities was not at all considered in that case. If it had been, we
cannot doubt that the clear intelligence, under the inspection of
which all propositions seemed to resolve themselves into their
elements, would have detected taxation of bonds under the disguise of taxation of the capital or shares of capital in which they
were invested, and would have pronounced against the indirect
as decisively as it did afterwards in Wleston v. (Iharlestown, against
the direct taxation.
What, then, was the intent of Congress? We think it not
very difficult to collect it from the provisos.
In most of the states, if not in all, the personal property of all
individuals and corporations is listed, valued, and assessed by
public officers under legislative authority. The first proviso
simply requires that the shares of individuals in national banking
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associations shall be included in this valuation and assessment;
and, inasmuch as personal property of different descriptions is
often valued and assessed by different rules, it further requires
that it shall not be so included at a greater rate than is assessed
upon other moneyed capital in the hands of citizens. The second
,proviso merely introduces another standard, by comparison with
which the taxation of these shares is to be regulated, and requires
that the tax imposed on them shall not exceed the rate imposed
by the state on the shares of banks organized under its authority.
We think this the plain sense of these provisos. They adopt
the exception proposed by Chief Justice MAnSHALL to the rule
of exemption in McCulloch v. Maryland. They subject the
interests held by citizens in the national banking associations to
a tax in common with other property of the same description, and
they give to the exception a practical application by determining
what property is of the same description with the interest to be
taxed in common with it.
Now, by taxation in common, we understand taxation by a
common rule and in equal degrees. To tax the shares of citizens
in these associations by other rules, or in greater degrees than
other like property, would as effectually retard, impede, burden,
and control the operation of the National Currency Act as to tax
the associations themselves or their lawful operations, and would
be clearly unwarranted by the Constitution.
What, then, is the rule, and what the degree in which taxes
can be imposed by the states on moneyed capital in the hands of
individual citizens ?
So far as that capital consists of ordinary funds or securities
acquired or held under the laws of the states, the measure of
taxation must necessarily be determined by the discretion of the
state legislature. The responsibility of their members to the
people, their own interests in common with those of their constituents, their knowledge, their justice, and their wisdom must
be relied on for security against injustice.
But so far as that capital consists of bonds or other securities
of the United States, it cannot be taxed at all by state authority
in the hands of individual citizens. That portion is exempted by
the Constitution, as interpreted by this court in the cases already
cited
Here, then, we have the common rule and common degree of
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taxation applicable alike to shares in national banking associations and to moneyed capital in the hands of individuals. That
proportion of each which is liable to taxation must be taxed alike;
that proportion of each which is exempt under the Constitution
must not be taxed at all by state authority. Taxation of the
former by no greater rate than the latter, means equal taxation
for both. Any construction of the proviso which denies the same
exemptions to the proportion of the shares invested in national
securities, which it concedes to the like proportion of other moneyed capital invested in like manner, seems to us manifestly at
variance with the declared intention of Congress.
But it is insisted that the shares of capital may be taxed by
another rule than that which governs the taxation of other moneyed capital, because of something peculiar in the nature of
shares. It is said that the association owns the capital, and that
the shareholders have no control over this property except through
the choice of officers, directors, or agents, and no right to the
property except the right to receive a due proportion of the earn.
ings of the association while it exists, and a similar proportion
of the property after its dissolution.
It is true that the shareholder has no right to the possession of
any part of the corporate property while the corporation exists,
and its affairs are honestly managed. He has committed his
interest, for a time, to the possession and control of the corporation of which he is a member, and he has only a member's voice
in the management of it.
So a man who has leased a farm has no right to possession or
control during the lease ; but who denies his property in the
farm? And if a dozen owners join in the lease, has not each one
an interest in the property to the extent of one-twelfth ?
So, if for the time the property of the shareholder is placed
beyond his direct control, and converted into property of the
association, hoW can that circumstance affect the intrinsic character of his shares as shares of the whole corporate property ?
How can a man's shares of any property be the subject of valuation at all if not with reference to the amount and productiveness
of the property of which they are a part? What value can they
have except that given them by that amount and that productiveness ? A certificate of title to a share is not a share. It is
evidence of the shareholder's interest. His interest may be
VOL. XIV.-40
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transferred by the transfer of the certificate; but it is not the
certificate that is valued when the worth of the share is estimated
either by the speculator in the market, or by the tax-assessor.
It is the property which it represents that is valued by the speculator often with reference to speculation only, but by the public
officer always, if he does his duty, by the real worth of the pro.
perty, all things considered.
It is said, also, that the taxation of the shares by the states
was intended as part of the price of the privileges granted to the
associations by Congress, and especially for the new use allowed
to be made of the bonds by depositing them as security for the
redemption of the circulating notes issued to the associations by
the government.
But while we see privileges grarited in the act to these associations, in order that they may fulfil the public purposes of their
organizations, and while we see that these privileges may enhance
the value of the capital invested, and consequently the value of
the shares, we see no new use allowed to be made of the bonds.
It has been common in many states, of late years, to require
banks of circulation to secure prompt redemption, by securities
with the state officers, and among such securities preference is
usually given to the bonds of the United States. But this is for
the benefit and security of the noteholders, not of the banks.
Requirement restricts rather than increases the amount of their
circulation.
These privileges, moreover, and the new use, if there be one,
are granted directly to the associations, and only indirectly to
the shareholders; and if the right to tax is to be inferred from
consent manifested by organization under the act, the tax should
be imposed on the capital of associations rather than upon the
shares. And we may remark, also, that the imagined new use is
restricted to the limited amount of bonds required as security for
circulation, while the greater part of the bonds, held by the associations, are not pledged at all, and no such reason as new use or
special privileges can be alleged for denying exemption to them.
It is worthy of notice that the banks of New York, whose
claim to the exemption of the bonds held by them from state
taxation, was held valid by the two decisions we have cited,
were organized upon the same principles with the national banking associations which now claim a similar exemption. The same
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privileges, substantially, were conferred on those institutions by
the laws of New York as are conferred on these by Act of Congress. The former were allowed to issue an amount of currency
proportioned to the bonds deposited by them with the bank superintendent, just as the latter are allowed to issue an amount proportioned to the bonds deposited by them with the Treasurer of
the United States. If the tax is the price of privilege in the
case of the latter, so it must have been in the case of the former.
If it is a duty on the new use of bonds by national banking associations, it was a duty on the same new use by the New York
banks. If consent of the former to taxation could be inferred
from organization, so'could the consent of the latter. And yet
it was held in the New York cases that the tax could not reach
the bonds which made a part of capital, while it is now held that
it may be imposed on the shares of the capital invested partly or
wholly in these bonds. Surely, no argument drawn from new
use or price of privilege can be valid for the latter tax which was
not valid for the former.
The truth is, we think, that Congress, when providing for state
taxation of shares, had no reference whatever to any new use of
bonds or any price of privilege. The national legislature was
engaged in providing a uniform currency for the whole country,
and for its circulation and redemption. For this and other great
national purposes the organization of the national banking associations was authorized, and it was expected that these associations would take the place of the state banks, from taxes on which
states derived considerable revenues. It was to remove the objections to the new system, founded on the loss of this revenue
through the conversion of state banks into national associations,
that Congress authorized the taxation of shares by the states.
This taxation should be allowed to the extent of the concession
of Congress. That concession limits it to the same taxation as
the states impose on moneyed capital in the hands of individuals
in whose hands the proportion invested in national bonds is
exempt. There is no reason for extending taxation on shares
beyond that concession.
But it is urged that other provisions in the Act of Congress
require that construction of the proviso which allows taxation on
shares without deduction of investments in national securities.
We think otherwise.
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One of these provisions is that which requires the capital to be
divided into shares of one hundred dollars each. This provision
only shows that at the outset each share of paid-up capital represented a property interest in the association bearing the same
proportion to the whole that one hundred dollars bore to the entire
capital.
The only other provision much relied on as favoring the construction of the majority is that clause of the 40th section which
requires the officers of the several associations to keep correct
lists of the names and residences of shareholders, subject to the
inspection of shareholders and creditors, and of the officers authorized to assess taxes under state authority. But is it not obvious
that this list would be as useful to the state officers in valuing the
shares with exemption of bonds as in valuing them without
exemption ?
It is said that exemption would embarrass valuation. How?
All the assessor would have to do would be to ascertain the value
of the whole property of the association and deduct the amount
of bonds. The remainder divided by the number of shares would
give the value of each share to be taxed. And the assessor must
value the whole property and divide it by the number of shares
in order to make a true valuation of shares. If he does not do
this, he must assess the shares at an arbitrary or speculative
valuation. This is not what is required. The law demands true
valuation; and true valuation, with deduction of bonds, places
the shareholder on exact equality with the holder of other mo.
neyed capital, which the law also demands. No other mode of
valuation secures that equality.
There is another provision of the act which appears to us conclusive of the correctness of our view. It is that clause of the
41st section which provides for taxation by the United States. It
imposes a tax of one per centum annually on circulation; onehalf of one per centum on deposits; and then one-half of one
per centum on the capital, beyond the amount invested in United
States bonds. Is it possible that Congress observed so scrupulously the obligations of good faith as to refuse to tax capital
invested in bonds for national purposes, and this in the midst of
war, and was yet so negligent of those obligations as to allow the
same capital invested in bonds to be taxed in shares, for state
purposes? Can it be supposed that Congress, having undoubted
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power to tax national securities, refrained from exercising it
because its exercise would be inconsistent with good faith, and
yet intended, by ambiguous phrases, and in the exercise of questionable constitutional authority, to authorize such taxation by
the states which, without such authority, could not impose it a#
all ? Suppose that by this clause Congress had imposed double
the amount of tax actually assessed, and had provided for the
payment of half of it to the states, that would have provided an
indemnity to the states for the loss of taxes on the state banks,
and would have subjected the national bonds to no tax. Is it
reasonable to believe that Congress intended to adopt another
mode of indemnity, which, by indirection, would subject those
bonds to heavy taxation, and that by the states ?
To us these questions seem to answer themselves. We are entirely satisfied that the construction of the proviso and the rule
for valuation of shares, which we have endeavored to vindicate,
is the true one, and the only one consistent with sound principle
and perfect faith. We dissent on this point from the majority of
the court with reluctance ; but we are constrained to dissent
We concur with the majority of the court as to the effect of the
second proviso.
The laws of New York, brought under review in the case before
us, provide for the taxation of the shares of the national banking
associations, and for the taxation of the capital of state banks, but
not of the shares ; while the second proviso of the Act of Congress requires that the tax on the shares of the former shall not
exceed the tax on the shares of the latter. It is clear that this
taxation by the state is not in accordance with the authority given
by Congress. The variance might not be a matter of much practical importance, if we agreed in opinion that taxation on capital
and shares must be by the same rule; but the application of the
rule of exemption, heretofore sanctioned, Jo the capital of the
state banks, while the rule denying exemption, which is now announced, is applied to the national associations, would work great
and manifest injustice. We think, moreover, that the second
proviso is a substantive part of the act which cannot be disregarded, and that it withholds from states, whose policy does not
allow the organization of banks and provide for the taxation of
shares, the authority to tax the shares of the national banking
associations.
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It is hardly necessary to add that we agree that the judgments
of the Court of Appeals in the three cases before us must be
reversed. But we think they should be reversed on the ground
that the taxation of New York is repugnant to the first proviso as
well as to the second.
' Mr. Justice WAYNE and Mr. Justice SwAYNE concur with me
in this opinion.

iSupreme Court of R7hode Island.
EDWARD C. MAURAN v. JAMES Y. SMITH, GOVERNOR OF
RHODE ISLAND.
Mandamus does not lie from a state court to the governor to compel the performance of an official duty, even of merely ministerial nature, where such duty
is enjoined on him by the Constitution, or where, though imposed by statute, it is
of such nature that he alone could perform it.
Whether it lies to enforce a statutory duty which might as well have been
devolved upon another officer, not decided.
It is immaterial whether the duty be of a political nature or one pertaining to
the governor in his capacity as commander-in-chief of the military forces.

The governor of Rhode Island having revoked the commission of
the relator as adjutant-general, the latter on the same day demanded
to be informed of the cause thereof and to be tried by a courtmartial, and no action having been taken by the governor for the
space of twenty-one days, the relator applied to the Supreme Court
for a mandamus to compel the governor to convene a court-martial
for the purpose of hearing charges and trying him thereon. The
statutes on the subject are as follows, Rev. Stat. R. I., chap.
239:" SEC. 10.-The commander-in-chief may revoke and cancel
the commission of any officer and discharge him from the service
in his discretion.
" SEC. 11.-Such revocation, cancellation, and discharge shall
not be effectual if, within ten days after receiving notice thereof,
such officer shall demand of his immediate superior to be informed
of the cause thereof and to be tried by a court-martial.
" SEC. 12.-If such demand be made, it shall be the duty of
the officer on whom it is made to transmit the same to the corn

31AURAN v. SMITH.

mander-in-chief, who shall give such officer the required information, and see that charges are duly preferred and that a courtmartial be convened to try the same."
A citation having been issued to appear and show cause why
the writ prayed for should not be allowed, the Governor appeared
by counsel and excepted to the jurisdiction of the court.
Messrs. Pitman, Payne, and Curry, for the relator.
Messrs. King and Blake, for the respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DURFEE, J.-The first question in this case is, whether the writ
of mandamus lies to compel the governor of a state to perform
an official duty. The question is not a new one in the courts.
In Arkansas (Hawkins v. The Governor, 1 Pike 570). in Georgia (Law v. Towns, 8 Ga. Rep. 360), in Illinois (People v.
Bissell, 19 Ill. 229), and in New Jersey (State v. The Governor,
1 Dutch. 331), it has been decided that the writ does not lie in
such a case. In Texas (Houston, &c., B. Co. v. Bandolph, 24
Texas 317)-if thejUnited States Digest, vol. 21, p. 372, may be
trusted,-it has been held that the writ does not lie to any member of the executive department except the land commissioner.
In Maine (JDennitt, Petitioner, 32 Me. Rep. 508), the court
refused to issue the writ to compel the governor and council to
perform a statutory duty, but for reasons which would have led
to its refusal if sued for against the governor alone. In Minnesota (Chamberlain v. Sibley, 4 Minn. Rer* 309), the court refused
to issue the writ to compel the governor to perform a duty prescribed by the Constitution, but delivered a dictum to the effect
that the writ would lie to compel the governor to perform a duty
prescribed by statute, and which might be performed as well by
one officer as another. In Missouri, in the case of The Pacific
B. B. Co. v. The Governor, 23 Mo. Rep. 853, the question was
much discussed, but the court expressly refrained from giving
an opinion upon it. On the other hand, in Ohio (State of Ohio
v. Chase, 5 Ohio N. S. Rep. 538), it was held that a writ of
mandamus may issue to compel a governor to perform a mere
ministerial duty enjoined' on him by statute, and which might
have been devolved on another officer of the state; though in
that case the writ was not issued, for reasons aside from the ques-
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tion of jurisdiction. In North Carolina (Cotton v. Elis, 7 Jones
N. C. 545), the court decided in favor of the jurisdiction, and,
for anything that appears, issued the writ; being the only instance which we find reported in which the writ has issued
against a governor, except where he consented to the jurisdiction
for the sake of getting the opinion of the court upon the merits
of the relation. These are all the cases which we find bearing
directly on this point, and, from the course of decision in them,
it is apparent that the weight of authority is against the jurisdiction.
One reason which has been suggested for refusing the writ is,
that, if granted, it would tend to provoke a conflict between the
judicial and executive branches of the government-a conflict in
which the judiciary would prove the weaker party. Of course,
in a case where the jurisdiction is clear, such a consideration
could have no weight; but where the jurisdiction is problematical
the consideration affords a presumption which it would be uhwise
to disregard. " For," as Blackstone has remarked, 1 all jurisdiction implies superiority of power; authority to try would be
vain and idle, without an authority to redress; and the sentence
of a court would be contemptible, unless that court had power
to command the execution of it :" 1 Shars. Bl. Com. 242. And
in this connection it is worthy of note, that in England, from
which we derive the process, not only is the king exempt from it,
but, among judicial tribunals, the higher courts of judicature
enjoy a similar immunity.
But the reason whic4 has been most effectual in determining
the courts to refuse the writ, is that which is drawn from the
division of the powers of government under our state constitutions, into three co-ordinate departments, legislative, executive,
and judicial, each independent of the others, except in so far as
it is subordinated to them by the Constitution. This division is
coeval with the states themselves, and has always been deemed
an indispensable safeguard of republican liberty. Mr. Madison,
in the 47th paper of the Fedbralist, traces the idea on which the
division is based to Montesquieu, who borrowed it from the
British Constitution, and who taught that civil freedom can not
co-exist with a union of the three powers in the same hands.
The doctrine, however, in its outlines at least, is as old as Aristotle, who recogmises the " three parts of all polities," and says,
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" where these subsist properly, the polity must necessarily be in
a flourishing condition :" Pol. B. IV. ch. 14 et seq. It was the
grand merit of Montesquieu to develop the doctrine more fully
than his predecessors, as it was his good fortune to find a multitude of disciples ready to receive it. His book appeared in
1748, and at once became the hand-book of political philosophy
for the more enlightened statesmen of both the Old and the New
World. The doctrine was, to some extent, reproduced in Blackstone's Commentaries, which appeared a few years later than
"The Spirit of the Laws ;" and it so became familiar, not only
to the more learned publicists, but to every lawyer in the land.
Accordingly, when the American colonies threw off the yoke of
the mother country, and formed. governments to suit themselves,
they universally made this division of power a fundamental principle of their constitutions. In some of them, as in Massachusetts, the principle was guarded by the most explicit inhibitions;
in others it was deemed sufficient simply to declare and observe
it as the ground-plan of the constitution. But in either case the
principle, except as expressly qualified, is equally inviolable; for,
in the words of Daniel Webster, " a separation of departments,
so far as practicable, and the preservation of clear lines of division
between them, is the fundamental idea in the creation of all our
constitutions, and, doubtless, the continuance of regulated liberty
depends on maintaining these boundaries."
The question then is, whether in view of this principle it is
competent for the court, by a writ of mandamus, to compel the
executive to do an official duty which he delays or declines to do
of his own accord ? It is admitted that wherever, within the
sphere of his duties, the executive has a discretion, he is amenable for refusing to perform them, not to the court, but only to the
Senate on an impeachment, or to the people at the polls. But
where the duty to be performed is merely ministerial, it is claimed
that a different rule obtains, and that the court may compel him
to perform it. If this be true, then, to the extent of his ministeriaa duties, the executive is not the co-ordinate of the judiciary,
but subordinate to it, and the line of separation between the two
departments is to that extent obliterated. Of course such a deviation from constitutional principle is admissible only in favor of
some other principle of higher obligation. But the only principle
adduced in support of the deviation, is the principle of the com-
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mon law, that for every right there is a remedy. Evidently that
is not enough; for a principle of the common law cannot override a principle of the Constitution. Consequently we find it
admitted, even in those cases which hold that a writ of mandamua
is issuable to the governor, that it will not issue to enforce a duty
which is enjoined on him by the Constitution, or which he alone
can perform, but only to enforce a statutory duty which might as
well have been devolved upon any other individual, the theory
being that, as to such a duty, the governor is on the same footing
as any other individual who might have been designated to perform it.
The distinction, however, between these two classes of duties,
which is thus recognised by some of the cases, is by others of
them either ignored or expressly repudiated. In this case it has
been urged as applicable in favor of the relator, and its validity
has consequently been much discussed. But whether the distinction be valid or not, we deem it unnecessary to determine; for
the duty which we are here asked to enforce, though prescribed
by statute, could not have been properly devolved on any one but
the defendant. It is a duty to see that charges are preferred
against a military officer, and that a court-martial is convened for
his trial, to consist of the highest military officer in the state
except the defendant, and of several other officers of superior
grade. To confide such a duty to any one except the commanderin-chief would be an extraordinary transgression of military
usage ; and, in a time of actual service, might occasion the most
embarrassing, if not fatal, disorders.
In this aspect of the case, however, the counsel for the relator
argues that the decisions which have been cited are not applicable
at all as authorities, for the reason that they were decisions in
cases where the writ was sued for to compel the governor to perform a civil or political duty; whereas, in this case, the writ is
sued far, not against the governor as such, but against the commander-in-chief, to compel him to perform a military duty. The idea
is, that the office of governor is separable from that of commanderin-chief, and that while as a civil magistrate the governor may
be exempt from the writ, as commander-in-chief he is subject to it.
We do not think the Constitution warrants any such discrinination. The Constitution declares that "the chief executive power
of this state shall be vested in a governor," and, in a subsequent

MIAURAN v. S.MITH.

section, declares that the governor " shall be captain-general and
commander-in-chief of the military and naval forces of this state."
In this respect it is similar to the constitutions of the other states,
and to the Constitution of the United States, which again is similar to the British Constitution, under which the king is "the
generalissimo, or the first in military command in the kingdom."
(1 Shars. Bl. Com. 262.) The supreme military command is
thus universally recognised, in all governments professing a
separation of the three powers, as a portion of the chief executive
power. (See I Kent's Com. 5th Ed. 282.) Indeed, in time of
civil convulsion, it is the most important portion of that power.
Supreme military command is in fact implied necessarily in the
grant of the chief executive power. The mere fact, then, that
the governor, jn his different capacities, is designated by different
titles, does not sever the unity of his office. When inaugurated,
he takes but a single oath, which binds him in all his functions.
If impeached and deposed, the sentence of deposition would deprive him of all his functions, whether impeached for a misdemeanor committed as commander-in-chief, or as a civil magistrate.
But if, under the American system of government, the supreme
military and civil authority is thus inseparably united in the
governor, then he is no more subject to the control of the judiciary in the one capacity than in the other. We think, therefore,
that the discrimination suggested by the counsel for the relator is
inadmissible.
But in reply to all this line of reasoning, it is urged that, if
in this case the writ of mandamus does not lie, then the relator
is without redress, and the great maxim of the law, that for every
right there is a remedy, is egregiously falsified. This is an argument to which no court of justice can be insensible. It cannot
escape remark, however, that the maxim which is quoted comes
to us from England, where it is subject to the same exception in
favor of the king, which is here claimed in favor of the governor.
Indeed it is one of those maxims which must, from the nature of
things, be understood with some qualification. If, for instance,
it were decided that the governor is amenable to the writ, the
court might, nevertheless, unjustly refuse it, and there would then
be no remedy for the wrong, except that which is applicable to
the governor as to the court, to wit: the remedy by impeachment.
The answer which naturally occurs to this is, that it is not to be

